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Abstract
One of the more fascinating themes of the present debate about the role of the State 
in international relations is represented by the concept of human security. This concept 
was first introduced in the Human Development Report published in 1994 by the UNDP 
as one of the five pillars of a new “people-centred world order”. In my contribution I 
will present the salient traits of theories of human security and security governance that 
operate on the foundation of proposals for global security in the official documents by 
UN, UNDP, OSCE in order to interprete human security as a part of a wider neo-liberal 
governmentality, putting both individuals and collectivities “at work” in a search for an 
economic self-governance.
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Resumen
Uno de los temas más fascinantes del presente debate acerca del papel del Estado en 
las relaciones internacionales está representada por el concepto de la seguridad humana. 
Este concepto fue introducido por primera vez en el Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano 
publicado por el UNDP en 1994 como uno de los cinco pilares de un nuevo “orden 
mundial centrado en las personas”. En mi intervención voy a presentar los rasgos sobre- 
salientes de las teorías de la seguridad humana y la gestión de la seguridad que operan 
sobre la base de las propuestas de la seguridad global en los documentos oficiales de la 
ONU, el UNDP y la OSCE, a fin de interpretar la seguridad humana como parte de un 
contexto más amplio de la gubernamentalidad neoliberal colocando tanto individuos 
y colectividades “en el trabajo” en una búsqueda de una auto-gobernanza económica.
Palabras clave
Desarrollo humano, gobernanza mundial, soberanía, neoliberalismo, relaciones in-
ternacionales.
One of the more fascinating themes of the present debate about the role of the State 
in international relations is the concept of human security. It was first introduced in 
the Human Development Report published in 1994 by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) as one of the five pillars of a new “people-centred world order”.1 
It was used to identify a new approach to security based on a two-fold conception of 
the term: “first, safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And sec-
ond, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily 
life”.2 Since then, it has developed within the new policy framework of human security 
governance.
Both the terms of security and governance are as much evocative as vague and am-
biguous. The latter is among the most recurrent expressions in the documents written 
1. UNDP, Human Development Report: New Dimension of Human Security, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, ch. 
2, p. 22. On the concept of human security, see: B. von Tigerstrom, Human Security and International Law. Prospects and 
Problems, Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland, OR, 2007; G. Frerks – B. Klein Goldewijk (eds), Human Security and Inter-
national Insecurity, Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, 2007; S. Tadjbakhsh – A.M. Chenoy, Human Security. 
Concepts and implications, Routledge, London-New York, 2007.
2. UNDP, Human Development Report, p. 22.
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by international agencies and institutions like the UN, the WTO, the World Bank, and 
the OECD used to designate a form, a style of governing that is different and alternative 
to that of centralised state government.3 This term is mostly understood to mean pro-
cesses and structures of decision that cannot be traced back to the exercise of political 
sovereignty. The term of security is also a very unclear one. Typically associated in the 
international relation to the ideas of ‘reason of State’ and ‘interests of the State’, security 
is conceived as the fundamental aim of a political order meaning self-preservation and 
survival. In the early 1990s, the transformations in global politics that occurred fol-
lowing the fall of Cold War balance have produced profound and substantial changes 
in the theory and practices of international politics. In particular, the UN have set out 
document policies on support and recovery for States and distressed populations on the 
basis of this new concept of human security in which the idea of security was enlarged 
and widened to understand also individual and collective ‘well-being’ and human de-
velopment. 
These changes in discourses on international relation are not only significant for 
their analytical and normative implications in regard of the role of the State in global 
politics. Human security is, in fact, depicted as a conceptual framework within with the 
role of governments is somehow limited and intertwined in a complex network of inter-
national actors, being a policy response primarily aimed at implementing basic human 
rights on a world-wide scale. These changes are indicative of the political transforma-
tion fostered by the so-called ‘globalization’ on the relation between State-building and 
socio-economic development. 
My interest is thus to investigate the relation between human security governance 
and the State as it is implied in current debate on human security. I will attempt to draft 
the central features of multiform policies, set to work by – and by means of – multiple 
actors, including the State, in order to bring about economic development, security and 
democratic government. As Paul Collier has pointed it out, human security may be 
interpreted as the attempt to respond to a wider ‘political economy of conflict’ being 
produced by a stronger international economic competition.4 I will focus on migration 
and global policies on recovery and support of displaced people so to highlight the role 
attributed to the global market and to economic actors. Lastly, I will briefly discuss 
3. A.M. Kjaer, Governance, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004. On the relation between governance and government see J.N. 
Rosenau – E.-O. Czempiel, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992.
4. P. Collier, “The Market for Civil War”, in Foreign Policy, n. 136 (May-June), 2003, pp. 38-45; P. Collier – A. Hoeffler, Greed 
and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank, Washington DC, 2001.
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global security governance as an expression of a non-statal government over popula-
tions, which necessitates the strengthening both of statal institutions and of autono-
mous dynamics of the competitive market. In fact, the relation between human security 
as a framework and economic development has not received enough attention so far in 
current literature on human security. 
From security system reform to human security governance
It was in the early 1980s that the Copenhagen School in International Relation de-
veloped an expanded theory of global security in which social aspects of this notion 
were emphasized. Their scholarly effort influenced the works of the the Brandt Com-
mission which in 1983 proposed that: 
security must be reconceived with people foremost in mind. The purely defensive 
concept of security should be enlarged to include hunger, disease, poverty, envi-
ronmental stress, repression, and terrorism, all of which endanger human security 
as much as any military provocation. To that end, the international community 
has the responsibility to eliminate any social conditions that pose threats to the 
protection and dignity of people, before they erupt into armed conflict5. 
This new agenda stimulated the reconsideration of civil-military relations, with the 
goal of promoting a definition of the security sector that can superannuate the mere 
subordination of the armed forces to regularly ‘elected’ civil leaders, as it was affirmed 
by the Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension (1990).6 The aims of this docu-
ment were the improvement of the efficacy of international interventions to guarantee 
the security of States, and the enlargement of spaces for the democratic control of the 
diverse institutions connected to the promotion of security. The Copenhagen docu-
ment stressed the necessity to reorient the concept of security from the state to the in-
dividuals and their communities, and to broaden the nature of security threats beyond 
purely military ones. 
5. J. B. Quilligan, The Brandt Equation: 21st century blueprint for the new global economy, Brandt 21 Forum, 2002, available 
at www.brandt21forum.info/BrandtEquation-19Sept04.pdf (last accessed 29 Oct. 2015). 
6. Later followed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in the same year and by the Moscow 
Document on the Human Dimension (1991).
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It is along this debate that the United Nations Development Programme first pro-
posed the concept in its 1994 Human Development Report. Quite optimistically, the 
UNDP predicted that “the idea of human security […] is likely to revolutionize society 
in the 21st century”.7 According to this agency, security should include issues such as: 
political and economic development, individual and collective protection from polit-
ical, ethnic and religious oppressions, from criminality and corruption, from poverty, 
illiteracy and disease as well as from natural calamities. In short, human security can be 
said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hun-
ger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.8
The reasons for this change in international relations and in global governance ap-
proach to security were expressed in 2000 by the Secretary-General of the UN Kofi 
Annan who launched the ‘Global Compact Initiative’ stressing that peace and interna-
tional security were placed in more danger from intra-statal conflicts than by conflicts 
between States. The weakness and the potential collapse of the State constituted dangers 
for regional and global security potentially greater than those represented by States en-
dowed with an excessive military power. The same campaign also emphasised how an 
entire series of non-statal actors were now able to put at risk the security and good gov-
ernance of States, and noted that the victims of the conflicts that have occurred in the 
post Cold War period have been constituted almost solely by civilians. Precisely in order 
to offer a response to these dramatic claims, the necessity of a collective security no 
longer focused on the security of States was proposed, a collective security that would 
be able to include a safety net for individuals, for their rights, and for their potentialities 
of development. Rethinking the concept of ‘security’ in international relations needed, 
nonetheless, the concomitant reshaping of the entire security sector.
In accordance to the indications given by the Secretary-General of the UN, a docu-
ment written in 2001 by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), entitled DAC Guidelines: 
Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, defined security as: an all-encompassing condition in 
which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the 
governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access 
to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not 
detrimental to their health and well-being. The security of people and the security of 
7. UNDP, Human Development Report, p. 22.
8. Ibid.
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states are mutually reinforcing. A wide range of State institutions and other entities may 
be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security.9 
On this basis, there was thus the need to begin a security system reform, understood 
as the affirmation of a ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, re-
sponsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a 
manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.10 
Security system reform has thus represented an important turning point in the 
codification of security and of the role that statal institutions must play in order to 
guarantee it, opening up to a ‘governance’ oriented approach to security policies dif-
ferent from more traditional interstatal relations. These approaches shared a defini-
tion of security as a twofold condition of freedom: freedom from fear – a definition 
compatible with a State-centric and ‘realist’ perspective – and a broader idea of free-
dom from want.11 Despite that, this approach was strongly contested both for its ex-
cessive extension of factors relevant to a notion of security understood, at least on the 
international level, in more limited terms, and for having offered a merely negative 
definition of security. 
Between 2000 and 2003, the concept has been therefore articulated around the two 
notions of ‘responsibility to protect’, adopted by the International Commission on In-
tervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) under the authority of the Canadian Govern-
ment, and ‘responsibility for development’, promoted by the Commission on Human 
Security (CHS), and by the Japanese minister Keizo Obuki.12 In fact, the document 
Human Security Now of 2003, written by the CHS and taken up by the UN, took into 
account and integrated both the proposals, affirming that human security “is concerned 
with safeguarding and expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires both shielding 
people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives”.13 
The following years, the concept of human security assumed an even ampler meaning 
9. OECD-DAC, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2001, p. 38.
10. Ibid.
11. S. J. Maclean – D.R. Black – T.M. Shaw (eds), A Decade of Human Security, Global Governance and New Multilateralisms, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006.
12. On these developments, see: R. Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air”, in International Security, 26, 2, 
2001, pp. 87-102; G. King – C.J.L. Murray, “Rethinking Human Security”, in Political Science Quarterly, 116, 4, 2001-2002, 
pp. 585-610; D. Henk, “Human Security: Relevance and Implications”, in Parameters, 25, 2, Summer 2005, pp. 91-106.
13. Commission on Human Security (CHS), Human Security Now, New York, 2003, p. IV. Two important previous do-
cuments that anticipated these themes: DAC, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2001, and DAC, 
Poverty Reductions, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2001. Also important it is the document “Security Issues And Development 
Co-Operation: A Conceptual Framework For Enhancing Policy Coherence”, in The DAC Journal, 2, 3, 2001, pp. 33-71. 
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when the UN itself endorsed it as a key component of ‘human security’ agenda begun 
in its programme of development. 
On the contrary, the document Security System Reform and Governance,14 proposed 
in 2005 by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, framed the concept 
of security within the interventions of governments and of international institutions 
in contexts of crisis. Security was associated “to personal and State safety, access to so-
cial services and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for 
economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights”.15 As a 
notion, security appeared to be still strongly concentrated on the use of public resources 
for the guaranteeing of security of citizens. In this sense, it confirmed the centrality of 
statal institutions connected to such a function. Although it was precisely with it that 
began the discussion around the themes of the ‘privatisation’ of security and of devel-
opments inherent to the market of private security. However, the lines of intervention 
established by the OECD posed the necessity of States’ favouring ‘extensive’ and struc-
tured policies of security not derivable solely from defence, intelligence and policing: 
“The overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure environment that is 
conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy”.16 A secure environment 
should in fact rest upon two essential pillars: 
i) the ability of the State, through its development policy and programmes, to gen-
erate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed; and 
ii) the ability of the State to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to pre-
vent or address security threats that affect society’s well-being.17
Overall, the reforming of the security sector proposed by the OECD remained 
State-oriented. The State must be capable of utilising its own political and institutional 
resources in order to guarantee the affirmation of a broader understanding of security. 
The goal is nonetheless to promote a notion of security that is no longer centred on the 
recognition of external and internal enemies, but that occurs within a ‘whole govern-
ment approach’, whose objectives are “[to] foster interministerial dialogue, implement 
institutional change, and mainstream security as a public policy and governance issue”.18 
In order to do so, however, the participation of multiple actors in shaping a ‘secure en-
vironment’ is needed. Civil society, adequately supported by international programmes 
14. OECD-DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2005, p. 11. 
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 16.
17. Ibid., italics mine.
18. Ibid., p. 12.
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of cooperation and development, must, in fact, create and diffuse “a pro-reform envi-
ronment for democratic governance”.19 In this sense, the establishment of a democratic 
environment is held to be the result of the promotion of secure and economically pro-
ductive areas. In this sense, Roland Paris believes that “the idea of human security is 
the glue that holds together a jumbled coalition of ‘middle power’ States, development 
agencies, and NGOs – all of which seek to shift attention and resources away from con-
ventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric 
of international development”.20 
The 2003 report Human Security Now, however, already clarified the reasons why 
the reform of sectors connected to security was an integral part, but not exhaustive, 
of a more complex human security. The security measures implemented by States and 
by international organisms had to be backed up by a set of different policies centred 
on the a variety of socio-economic players, among them the State. This raises the issue 
of the convergence of different spatialities. In fact, while the measure implemented by 
States must take place within a specific territory, policies activated by global institutions 
or network of actors may operate in narrower as well as broader territorialies. These 
networks, that have to support and promote institutional measures eventually adopted 
by single States, may not have a determinate territorial basis. On the contrary, these 
may take place in the ‘interstices’ between States and non-State spatialities as they are 
composed by different institutions, agencies and social actors that operate on the global, 
regional or local level.
Certainly, if “security and development are increasingly seen as being inextricably 
linked”, it thus becomes necessary “to mainstream security as a public policy and gover-
nance issue”.21 It is precisely due to this that the report Human Security Now emphasised 
the complementarity between human security and security of the State. In particular, it 
emphasised the necessity of favouring the care of individuals and of communities in a 
context that does not contemplate in an exclusive fashion threats comprehended as dan-
gers for security: “achieving human security includes not just protecting people but also 
empowering people to fend for themselves”.22 For such an end, “the range of actors is 
expanded beyond the State alone”.23 The security of the State is no longer, therefore, the 
predominant target of security and the State is no longer the key actor. Rather, it may 
19. Ibid., p. 16.
20. R. Paris, Human Security, p. 88. 
21. OECD-DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, p. 16.
22. CHS, Human Security Now, p. 4.
23. Ibid, p. 52.
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constitute an instrument, albeit necessary, for guaranteeing the promotion of democratic 
freedoms and the development of a competitive market on regional scales.
On human security governance 
From being a category articulated prevalently around the necessities of self-preser-
vation of the State, security, thus, come to be interpreted as a human security. The rea-
sons for this transformation are multiple. The permanent conflictuality of the so-called 
Cold War, whose strongly ideological traits characterised the multiplication of internal 
wars in the context of a relatively stable international order, has been substituted by 
an incoherent and multiform intertwining of wars between States, international police 
operations, preventative aggressions, humanitarian crises, terrorisms and national and 
global resistances. The military equilibrium between the super powers, which even gave 
some form and a direction to the dispersed instances of conflict in the world, has fallen, 
thus liberating energises and tensions to which it appears to be difficult today to give a 
single meaning. Moreover, the new tensions driven by environmental calamity and by 
economic crisis needed for a different representation of the international order.
Thus, if security was understood and practiced as national security and defined in 
military terms during the Cold War, the proliferation in the last two decades of threats, 
emergencies and risks favoured the progressive amplification of the concept. As Heiner 
Hänggi observed: “It was increasingly noted that security might be endangered by more 
than military threats alone, which led to the inclusion of political, economic, societal 
and environmental aspects”. Moreover, he also noted that “there is a growing recog-
nition that in the age of globalization, and with the proliferation of internal wars and 
‘failed States’, individual and collectives other than the State could, and indeed should, 
be the object of security”.24
These processes fostered a double transformation in the approach to the theme of 
security. In the first place, there was the elaboration of a new politics of security, de-
scribed as security sector reform, which has put in discussion both the strictly statal 
defensive interpretation of security and also the centrality attributed to the public-statal 
actors, particularly the army and the police. If both the statal institutions as well as those 
structures whose primary function is to protect society have traditionally been ascribed 
24. H. Hänggi, “Making Sense of Security Sector Governance”, in H. Hänggi – T.H. Winkler (eds.), Challenges of Security 
Sector Governance, LIT Verlag, Münster, 2003, p. 6.
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to the level of security, the expression security sector instead attempted to expand its 
goals and methods from the usual military environment to include public security and 
individual security from crime, disorder and violence. In the second place, in the con-
text of the new security agenda, the notions of security and of development are shown 
to be interdependent. Security was no longer related in exclusive terms to the level of 
statal defence of its own order or the level of the security of the population faced by 
pressing and imminent threats. It was also associated to processes of growth and of eco-
nomic-social development that, while based on policies of promotion and of individual 
and collective defence from immediate threats, should contribute to the strengthening 
of the State and the care of populations. 
Security developed in human security by including in a single nexus two different 
approaches:
a) the first, which we can call security-preservation, includes the most common re-
flection on the defence of the State and of the nation from the external and internal 
enemy. A particular tension is also assumed in this case, a tension that is relative to the 
strengthening of the statal institutions by means of processes of international gover-
nance (of help and support) and of State-building.
b) the second can be defined as security-development. This is the security related 
to intervention on populations, on their productive and self-reproductive potenti-
alities. It is the more complex human security that, theorised by the UN, explicitly 
underwrites the proposals of global security governance. It prefigures, alongside 
processes of State-building, paths of market-building and of ‘activation’ of a potent 
civil society.
The first approach includes both that range of instruments at the disposition of the 
State – the ordinary and extraordinary constitutional provisions, the army, the intelli-
gence services – that aim to guarantee the preservation of the political stability faced by 
pressing threats, and also the processes of institutional, bureaucratic and administrative 
construction that tend to configure a stable, efficient and democratic statal architecture. 
The second approach, on the other hand, includes those dispositifs that aim to promote 
a certain economic and social development, in such a way as to constitute not so much 
the objective of processes of political and institutional stabilisation, as in the past, but 
their precondition. 
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This twofold strategy of security is only partially concerned with States and borders, 
as it aims at governing populations and individuals according to a project of socio-eco-
nomic strengthening and development centred on a democratic and (neo)liberal polit-
ical model. However, this strategy cannot, and does not want, to reduce the State to an 
instrument of order and of containment of conflicts and of populations. On the one 
side, the strengthening of the State – through policies of State-building – is a necessary 
tool for any socio-economic development. On the other side, the strengthening of the 
State and of its institutions depends on the promotion of the well being and on the 
economic development of a population. In situations in which a State does not exist or, 
though existing formally, is not able to guarantee any security, the model activated by 
human security imply that the global market society and its actors have to take the lead 
of any process of State-building and recovery. The global market and the global civil 
society may offer that political legitimacy and the consensus missing in weak or failed 
institutions. 
Recent reflections on security governance derive from the failure of traditional pol-
icies of peace-building, and from the evident limits of programmes of peace-enforcing. 
In this sense, Antonio Franceschet argued that human security is a concept that can 
be made intelligible by “the politics of applying law and legalism to global politics”, 
and that “it has been applied and implemented […] primarily through legalistic initia-
tives”.25 This is certainly true in many cases. However, as I will briefly discuss by focusing 
on the connexion between migration, population and development, it is deemed the 
networks of regulative power and of international organisms to promote the construc-
tion of a market economy. Moreover, by means of this, to favour the emergence of a civil 
society and to offer the legitimacy necessary for the formation of a firm statal authority. 
In other words, only the correct functioning of the market and of the autonomous flows 
of international civil society can give birth to processes (often diversely intended) of 
statal and territorial stabilisation. 
Populations, migrations, development
Security governance shapes a set of policies that intervene in the most diverse as-
pects of human life. These policies find application on local, regional, and global levels 
25. A. Franceschet, “Global legalism and Human Security”, in S.J. Maclean – D.R. Black – T.M. Shaw (eds.), A Decade of 
Human Security, p. 31.
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by intervening on individuals and on populations. Certainly, themes such as the control 
and administration of birthrates and mortality, the proliferation of conflicts and wars, 
the struggles against epidemics, famine, new diseases, poverty and scarcity of resources, 
posit the exercise of a specific governmentality – or biopolitics – at the centre of these 
policies. 
This governmentality has as its object not only the States, nor simply individuals, 
but populations, although the individual remains the social unity of reference. The in-
dividual appears as the holder of basic human rights and is at the basis of processes 
of construction of the democratic-representative political architecture. These processes 
represents procedures of empowerment and democratization. Yet when security inter-
venes as a guarantee of safety or of development, it does so because of a profoundly 
different logic of government. This logic affects population as an ‘aggregate body’ and 
as a set of processes and phenomena to be appropriately managed. 
In this context, the territorial dimension shows its importance as a principle of 
separation and spatial division that is necessary for the localisation of security inter-
ventions.26 Indeed, processes of State-building and market-building that underlie pol-
icies of global security governance can have a positive outcome only if they guarantee 
socio-economic stabilisation and institutional localization. Nonetheless, in the human 
security approach to global crisis the existence of an indissoluble relation between State 
and territory is no longer the precondition for the existence of sovereign political order. 
On the contrary, it is the construction of a sovereign order that may becomes the object 
of territorialized policies. In this sense, control and management of migrations, the con-
tainment of phenomena like movement and de-localisation of populations due to envi-
ronmental or military crises, represent the principal testing ground of these policies, as 
they lie at the crossroad of all these problems.27 Discourses around security, when they 
are applied to these phenomena, are perhaps those that help us to understand the logic 
of the governance of populations that underlies contemporary reflections on human 
security and the role that they attribute to the State.
The logic of governing the phenomenon of migration follows the lines of promot-
ing foreseeable and ordered movements through concerted and multilateral policies of 
global governance of migrations: “Multilateral approaches are essential for promoting 
orderly and predictable movements of people. Needed is an international migration 
framework of norms, processes and institutional arrangements to ensure such order 
26. S. Mezzadra – B. Neilson, Border as Method, or the Multiplication of Labor, Duke University Press, Durham, 2013.
27. D. Graham (ed.), Migration, Globalisation and Human Security, Routledge, London, 1999.
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and predictability”.28 Order and predictability are, in these cases, verifiable objectives 
only based on the efficacy of territorial intervention of implemented policies. These 
policies certainly exist due to the contribution of several actors, but they still attribute 
a central role to statal authorities. It is precisely the necessity of control and territorial 
management of phenomena, fluid in their own nature, which pushes towards concerted 
policies and toward the strengthening of territorial divisions. This is because “to identi-
fy and implement solutions to displacement situations […] through voluntary repatri-
ation, resettlement or integration into host communities”29 implies an effort by the in-
ternational community to reinforce territorial control and government of populations, 
exercised by State institutions with the support of supranational actors and policies.
In this sense, the change that has occurred in the last decades regarding support 
policies for refugees is significant. While refugees were previously ‘taken care of ’ by wel-
coming policies shaped on the principle of an individual right to find refuge in the host 
country – a policy with a juridical matrix, which is focused upon the individual as the 
bearer of inalienable rights – the refugee is today ‘taken care of ’ by security policies that 
provide assistance and support to repatriation, but also forced mobilisation, of popu-
lations.30 These policies are supported by humanitarian intervention which is offered 
by the networks of organisations and international agencies, and that are implemented 
by resorting – when necessary – to the usage of force by States. The State is therefore 
confirmed both as the holder of a monopoly of the usage of legitimate violence and as 
the holder of a monopoly upon the legitimate circulation of commodities and people.31 
However, at least in the latter case, the regulation of processes and the management of 
fallouts produced by this regulation are undertaken by international security ‘agents’. 
In this light, the pronouncement of the High Commission of the United Nations for 
refugees in its Hague Program of 2004 is significant.32 It maintained “an increasing ex-
ternalisation of tools and measures of control of migrations, even of those aiming to 
make policies of repatriation more effective”.33 Instead of structuring interventions on 
the basis of individual rights, the eventual attribution of which remains among the 
competences of territorial sovereignties, security governance tries to define a migration 
28. CHS, Human Security Now, p. 52.
29. Ibid.
30. On this theme, see: H. Adelman, “From Refugees to Forced Migration: the UNHCR and Human Security”, in Interna-
tional Migration Review, 35, 1, 2001, pp. 7-32.
31. J. Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000.
32. Presidency Conclusions, 4-5th November 2004 – 14292/04 Annex I.
33. E. Rigo, “Pratiche di cittadinanza e governo della circolazione nello spazio europeo”, in A. Vinale (ed.), Biopolitica e 
democrazia, Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 2008, p. 291.
Alessandro Arienzo          HUMAN SECURITY
62
Soft Power          Volumen 2, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2015
framework within which these moves can be played out and their containment and pro-
tection can be offered. Certainly, this framework will be able to work only by means of 
States and beyond them, since migrations and movements of people, whose dimension 
is irreducible to territorial divisions, make de-territorialised policies necessary, along-
side strongly territorialising policies. Without a clear territorial dimension, it appears 
to be difficult to build a system capable of individuating in time the risks that relate to 
these phenomena and to operate in order to restrain situations of worse disadvantage: 
“The security risks arising during large-scale forced population movements need to be 
acknowledged and better understood […] Given the permeability of borders and the 
ease of travel, efforts to strengthen the refugee regime and establish and international 
migration framework need to be accompanied by improvements in the protection of 
the internally displaced persons”.34
Security governance, therefore, is exercised by attempting to prevent, to anticipate 
and to govern the crisis in consideration of the ineliminable facts that are offered by mi-
gration impulses, by the fallibility of policies of repression or by the mere containment 
of migrations. In this context, development and economic promotion policies assume a 
prevalent and determinant role, in a double sense: on the one hand, the construction of 
a market society promotes wealth and economic development, thus slowing down the 
most dramatic reasons for the movements of populations and favouring a migration 
that is linked to aspirations instead of necessities. On the other hand, the promotion of 
regulated and ordered movements of people across the borders, “reinforces the interde-
pendence of countries and communities and enhances diversity. It facilitates the trans-
fer of skills and knowledge. It stimulates economic growth and development”.35 The 
link between development and migration is certainly complex: if natural fluctuations of 
markets and the unavoidable phases of economic crisis can push people to emigrate, it 
is also true that most of the movements that are directed towards the richest countries 
come from middle-income countries. This occurs because “research also shows that 
poverty reduction strategies may contribute to increased movements of people in the 
short and medium terms because people have access more to the money, information 
and networks that are essential for moving from one country to another”.36
Migratory policies are, thus, closely linked both to demographic dimensions and 
to dimensions of control of resources (human and environmental) as well as to di-
34. CHS, Human Security Now, p. 52.
35. Ibid., p. 41.
36. Ibid., p. 44.
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mensions of the economy and the market. Franck Düvell has emphasised how the 
current policies are articulated beginning from needs of the labour market and how 
they compose a global regime of government of ‘hybrid’ migrations, in which States, 
post-national formations and new global actors such as the International Organisa-
tion for Migration or the multiple NGOs that intervene in this theme.37 In the section 
of Human Security Now entitled Economic security – the power to choose among op-
portunities, as well as in the document A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism 
Prevention, the connection between security and development is also evoked in order 
to respond to the fears provoked by an international terrorism that is favoured by 
these movements of people and populations. Migration data, and in more general 
terms movements of populations and people, assume a very particular importance 
within the framework of security policies. This happens because these movements, 
more than other phenomena, reveal the deep insecurity that characterise the condi-
tion of the planet. It is possible to address this condition only by defining ‘structural’ 
and long-term policies. For this reason, both documents strongly stressed the ne-
cessity of programmes to structure the relation between governments, donors, and 
all those actors who are involved in the processes of prevention of conflicts and of 
support for development. At the same time, the necessity of strengthening gover-
nance by means of policies that encourage the correct development of difficult areas is 
re-emphasised. In other words, “the key issue is how to establish a democratic political 
order, buttressed by social and economic growth”.38
The governmental logic that gives shape to the specific practices of government of 
security governance is thus the expression of the efforts to redefine the relations be-
tween State and the global civil society as an agent of economic development. In this 
sense, what Michel Foucault wrote in his 1978 course on biopolitics seems to be con-
firmed: namely, that what was specifically at stake in the liberalism that developed from 
the 1930s until contemporary neo-liberalism is “how the overall exercise of political 
power can be modeled on the principles of a market economy”.39 Security governance 
shows how the global exercise of a certain type of political power is based upon princi-
ples of regulation of the economic system. In this sense, today a new and very particular 
37. F. Düvell, “La globalizzazione del controllo delle migrazioni”, in S. Mezzadra (ed.), I confini della liberta. Per un’analisi 
politica delle migrazioni contemporanee, DeriveApprodi, Roma, 2004, pp. 23-50. See also Sandro Mezzadra’s Introduction to 
the volume: Capitalismo, migrazioni e lotte sociali. Appunti per una teoria dell’autonomia delle migrazioni, pp. 7-19.
38. CHS, Human Security Now, pp. 67-68, italics mine.
39. M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, Palgrave-Macmillan, London, 2008, 
p. 131.
Alessandro Arienzo          HUMAN SECURITY
64
Soft Power          Volumen 2, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2015
intertwining between macro- and micro-economic paradigms would seem to confirm 
the foucauldian thesis of a liberal system that composes an: 
[…] economic and social regime in which the enterprise is not just an institution 
but a way of behaving in the economic field – in the form of competition in terms 
of plans and projects, and with objectives, tactics, and so forth – you can see that 
the more the law in this enterprise society allows individuals the possibility of be-
having as they wish in the form of free enterprise, and the greater the development 
of multiple and dynamic forms typical of this “enterprise” unit […].40
The taking of distance from the pure model of the vertical exercise of government 
security is perhaps one of the characterising elements of contemporary reflections on 
global governance. Additionally, it seems indicative of the crisis of liberal governmen-
tality; a crisis that could be referred to the increase of the economic cost of the exercise 
of freedom. The foucauldian thesis is particularly important precisely because it ties the 
crisis in the form of liberal governmentality to the contextual promotion of freedom, 
and, it reveals the relation between security policies and the government of the popu-
lation. 
Human security represents an effort to activate pro-social behaviours. It is in the 
attempt of building a complex of inter-individual and collective pro-social relations 
that we find the profound reason for the emergence of a security governance that aims 
to structure a new relation between the State and non-State actors, although within 
the limits that are imposed by the equilibrium between economic development, secu-
rity dispositifs, and representative democracy. Economic development of the market 
and democratic political order thus compose a system of verification – the principle 
upon which the results reached by security governance policies can be verified. There-
fore, security, development, and population are perhaps the terms that more than 
others mark how the processes of transformation of current liberal governmentality 
express a “critical” moment of acceleration and systemic change. On the one hand, 
there is the will to see the political democratic model affirmed on a global scale; on 
the other hand, there is the attempt to support this model by means of policies of gov-
ernance that empty the representative dimension and reduce the space of the exercise 
of government. In similar terms, there is therefore the attempt to favour autonomous 
40. Ibid., p. 175.
developments of a competitive market through regulative policies that, however, must 
be supported by dispositifs of security because the conservation and the increase, on 
a global level, of prevalent power structures need the enlargement of the liberal polit-
ical space and of the market.
Conclusions
The 1994 document launched by the UN offered a conception of human security 
in many ways different from the notion of ‘security of the individual’, conceived both 
in the current fashionable neoliberal sense and in the most typical liberal notions of 
competitive and possessive individual. Since then, the ‘failure of the State’ has resulted 
in the pursuit of human security through the informal sector, beyond the reach of the 
formal institution of the State, and through the development of complex networks of 
diverse players acting on multilevel spatial and institutional dimensions. In 1995 the 
UN set a target of a 50 per cent reduction in the number of people existing in absolute 
poverty in 2015, and Caroline Thomas sharply observed that this outcome was “to be 
delivered not by any redistributive mechanism, but rather by the application of the 
particular neoliberal model of development promoted in the 1980s and 1990s by global 
governance institutions”.41
Human security governance thus refers to liberal democracy as to the political 
framework for global politics, although the institutional model is shifted from ‘peo-
ple representation’ and ‘nation-State sovereignty’ to a more complex and ambiguous 
‘Government plus Governance’ system. In dealing with failed or quasi-failed States, the 
weakness of State institutions is compensated for by transnational networks of support, 
processes of political or economic localisation/delocalisation, or of re-allocation on a 
macro-regional or global scale of decision-making processes. Within this approach, the 
State remains, on the global level, the unity of measure of political spaces by guaran-
teeing those territorial divisions from which the organisation, prediction, intervention 
upon movements (of men or commodities) and management of flows begins. In this 
sense, security governance may well strengthen and attenuate the role of the State ac-
cording to the context and the situations. Individuals and populations are the targets of 
41. C. Thomas, “Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links”, in Third World Quartely, 
22, 2, 2001, p. 160. See also: C. Thomas, “Where is the Third World Now?”, in Review of International Studies, 25, 1999, pp. 
225-244; C. Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality, Pluto 
Press, London, 2000.
Alessandro Arienzo          HUMAN SECURITY
66
Soft Power          Volumen 2, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2015
new governmental practices exercised on a local and global scale, which, although they 
transcend the State, exploit its sovereign dimension in order to guarantee the continuity 
of those processes of political individualisation that we call citizenship. Security gover-
nance and human security governance precisely intervene in those contexts where the 
cores of State-political power are weaker, but the possibility to build a political-State or-
der, based on market and civil society principles, is greater. In these areas, the construc-
tion of concurrential and competitive open markets is the base of human development 
and of the construction of pluralist democracy. 
Human security thus poses the problem of a ‘non-statal’ government of popula-
tions at the centre of the reform efforts of the international organisations – a reform 
which is realised means of policies of territorial State-building and market-build-
ing, and by means of policies that support transnational networks of collective actors 
and regulative powers. In this sense, human security seems to activate two types of 
processes: the first can be referred to as policies of construction and reinforcement 
of statal institutions; the second aims to promote productive relations that can fa-
vour the birth of an efficient and competitive market. In the opening scene of this 
emerging human security governance, the themes of development and of democracy 
constitute the fulcrum around which it seems possible to create a pro-market and 
pro-social global environment that can be very broadly labelled ‘neo-liberal’. When 
human security fails, nonetheless, traditional security policies – from diplomacy to 
military action – will take the lead.
